Michael Lenihan

COUNTERTERRORISM & THE UN

The United Nations has actively fought terrorism for 40 years. It has condemned terrorist attacks, sanctioned terrorist-supporting states, and approved of unilateral military interventions targeting terrorist organizations. The UN’s approach to counterterrorism has evolved as much as the UN organs responsible for addressing the issue. The General Assembly led initiatives during the Cold War. In this era, terrorist attacks were localized and relatively nontechnical. The attacks on September 11, 2001 demonstrated a new, complex, and globalized threat. Security Council members responded in full. Resolutions passed in the wake of the attacks showed the Security Council seizing power in an attempt to catch up with a more expansive, savvier and well-funded threat to international peace and security. This essay examines the UN’s modern approach to counterterrorism, looking at the evolution of terrorist organizations, development of political will to counterterrorism, and the institutionalization of counterterrorism efforts. It concludes with recommendations for improving counterterrorism.

Evolution of Terrorism and Counterterrorism

The UN first mentioned the concept of “terrorism” in a 1948 resolution condemning the assassination of its Palestinian mediator, Count Bernadotte.[1] The resolution noted the assassination was the work of “a criminal group of terrorists.” [2] However, the Council did not define what it meant by “terrorists.” This ambiguity has endured till present day. It is a highly politicized question carrying serious implications. Political scientist Margaret Karns frames the issue as, “how to formulate the term without criminalizing all armed resistance to oppressive regimes…how to distinguish legitimate armed struggle from terrorism and how much emphasis to place on identifying root causes of grievances that lead individuals and groups to adopt terrorist methods.”[3] As imaginable, states struggling with identity or territorial issues oppose a sweeping definition that includes state actions against rebellious groups.

Given these tensions, the UN has avoided a firm definition of “terrorism.” Instead, it has created norms couched in human rights language. It has relied primarily on the targeting of unarmed civilians to gain consensus among Security Council members. This is the only consistently-agreed upon element of “terrorism” that has been codified.[4] The UN’s current description of terrorism reads, “any act that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such act, by its nature of context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.”[5]

To understand what form of terrorism the UN focuses on today, it is necessary to outline what types of terrorism exist or have existed. Terrorism can be sorted into four categories – one related to state-sponsored terrorism, and three related to nonstate terrorism. State sponsored terrorism is also referred to as “national terrorism.” [6] It consists of proactive and excessive measures taken by governments to combat rebellious factions. Saddam Hussein’s chemical weapons attacks on the Kurds is one example; Sri Lanka’s liquidation of the Tamil Tigers is another. This does not include a government’s legitimate reaction to internal acts of aggression from rebellious factions. Such examples include the Spanish government’s responses to ETA attacks. These strikes are considered legitimate if they respond to internal aggression in a timely, proportionate, and targeted way. Instances where this is the case can be called “anti-terrorist measures” and are not traditionally condemned by the UN.[7]

Nonstate terrorism is multifaceted. It includes terrorist organizations backed by foreign governments, local organizations empowered by governments to strike abroad, or independent organizations hostile to both host country and countries abroad. First, consider a terrorist organization backed by a foreign government. This is a symbiotic relationship. The terrorist organization seeks a political objective, such as greater autonomy or independence. The foreign government sees this objective as integral to its own national security or interest. Therefore, it supplies weapons, money, or human resources to the terrorist organization. Turkey’s loose affiliation with Islamic fighters in Syria is one example; US support of the contras against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua is another.[8] Note that the so-called terrorist activities in this type of relationship targets governments, not citizens. This is an important distinction from the following two types of terrorism. These types exploit civilian causalities, using them as the cornerstone of their approach.

The second type of nonstate terrorism involves states supportive of terrorist organizations located in their own country. This is again a symbiotic relationship. However, it differs in scope from foreign-backed terrorism. Here, governments reap financial and materiel benefits by harboring terrorist organizations. The Taliban’s cooperation with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan is a prime example. Osama bin Laden funded and armed the Taliban during Afghanistan’s civil war.[9] Al-Qaeda also provided some social services and support nets to rural populations.[10] In return, al-Qaeda was allowed to establish training camps, transport recruits, and work uninterrupted on building an international fundraising machine. In so doing, al-Qaeda revolutionized the way terrorism was administered. Their modern approach leveraged new technology and capitalized on the weak state system in Afghanistan. Karns explains, “The increased ease of international travel and telecommunications…made transnational terrorism less confined to a particular geographic place and enabled terrorist groups to form global networks and to move money, weapons, and people easily from one area to another – thus creating a global problem.”[11]

Renegade terrorist organizations occupy the final category of “terrorism.” Here, nebulous terrorist organizations wage violence against their home state as well as abroad. This is a relatively new phenomenon. Examples can be seen in Nigeria, Mali, Somalia, and Syria where radical Islamists seek to create a pure Islamic state in Northern Africa, the Levant, and the Iberian Peninsula. They carry out attacks against Christian, moderate Muslim, and non-Muslim civilians and government officials. The Combating Terrorism Center at the American War College notes these renegade terrorist organizations have “near enemies” in the Maghreb and Sahel, as well as “far enemies” – namely former colonial powers France and Spain, and the United States.[12]

These last two categories of terrorism pose a great threat to international peace and security today. State-backed and renegade organizations adopted terrorist tactics practiced during the Cold War and early 1990s, and brought them to the doorsteps of Western powers. Local threats became global threats. It was these types of terrorist organizations to which President George W. Bush was referring when he launched the “war on terror.” Instead of citing the attacks as isolated incidents, President Bush reframed terrorism as a “pattern that needed to be addressed frontally.”[13] Under strong leadership from the United States, the UN followed suit. It transitioned from a case-specific approach to a generalized approach. The before-and-after affects of this evolution can be seen in two case studies: the 1998 US embassy bombings in East Africa, and the September 11th attacks in New York and Washington, D.C.

When the Taliban bombed the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the UN responded with strong but traditional measures. It imposed sanctions against the regime, increasing their strength and scope over time.[14] This response was similar to the UN’s punishment of Sudan and Libya following their involvement with airliner bombings in the late 1980s. The sanctions levied against Khartoum and Tripoli were duel purpose. First, they sought to force compliance. Khartoum and Tripoli refused to hand over the masterminds behind the bombings. Extensive and severe sanctions eventually forced the governments to acquiesce to international pressures.[15] Sanctions also signaled the UN’s objection to state-sponsored terrorism. When the Taliban struck the US embassies, history suggested it too would be responsive to sanctions. Unfortunately, the Taliban regime proved to be a different beast than Sudan or Libya. Scholars note that the Taliban and al-Qaeda had “situated themselves outside of the international system and reject[ed] its institutions and norms.”[16] This is an ideological argument. However, there were also very real reasons the sanctions were ineffective in breaking the Taliban’s relationship with al-Qaeda. IR scholar Edward Luck suggests,

“There are a number of reasons for the mixed results. The leaders of Libya and Sudan were not asked to give up anything really integral to their power base, whereas the Taliban depended on bin Laden and his legions for military, financial, and political support in the ongoing civil war in Afghanistan. The prospect of further isolation in the international community, moreover, apparently mattered a good deal more to the better-established leaderships in Tripoli and Khartoum than to the radical clerics of the Taliban, who had little to lose either materially or diplomatically.”[17]

Uninspiring results prompted the UN to create its first-ever sanctions monitoring committee. The Security Council also issued Resolution 1269, condemning “all acts, methods, and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation.”[18] The UN’s counterterrorism approach matured with this resolution. It encouraged states to expel terrorist organizations and interrupt financing and recruitment channels.[19]

The attacks on September 11th revolutionized the UN’s counterterrorism approach more dramatically. Within 24 hours of the towers collapsing, the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1368. The Resolution condemned the attacks and recognized the United States’ inherent right to “individual or collective self-defense in accordance with the Charter.”[20] Two weeks later, the Council authorized Resolution 1373 – an expansive and unprecedented piece of legislation institutionalizing the UN’s counterterrorism efforts. These resolutions, along with a series of others, became the bedrock for the UN’s modern-day approach to combating nonstate terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda. Before examining these resolutions further, however, it is important to understand the shift in the Security Council’s mentality that enabled such sweeping reforms.

A More Active Security Council

The General Assembly has long led the initiative against terrorism. The Council’s lack of drive or desire to define “terrorism” and the remoteness and infrequency of attacks, contributed to the Council’s unwillingness to legislate. During its decades of oversight, the General Assembly passed a total of 13 international conventions prohibiting and limiting particular aspects of terrorism.[21] These resolutions covered a broad range of topics. They addressed issues of hijacking, attacks on public spaces, hostage taking, attacks on diplomatic personnel, terrorist bombings, and nuclear terrorism. Despite the scope of topics, these resolutions were not binding on member states. That changed following September 11. The Security Council jerked into action, asserting itself far into counterterrorism. If the Council’s sanctions against Libya, Sudan, and the Taliban signaled interest in the issue, September 11 was a watershed moment.

Political scientist Chantal de Jonge Oudratt cites five factors that contributed to the Security Council – and especially the United States’ – increased attention to counterterrorism.[22] First, there was an increasing number of terrorist attacks targeting US citizens or government facilities.[23] One study suggests that attacks on US targets increased from about 20 percent of the total attacks between 1993 and 1995 to almost 50 percent of the total in 2000.[24] Second, the average number of causalities per attack grew by roughly forty percent within those same two windows. Third, al-Qaeda’s global network was larger and more expansive than any previously known terrorist organization. Some scholars have even called it the “only true prototype” of the modern-day terrorist organization.[25] Fourth, there was growing concern among Council members that terrorist would obtain chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. Last, and unsurprisingly, the United States was now fully committed to driving reform on the issue. Other members needed little convincing.

Security Council members directed their efforts towards stopping terrorism in its tracks. They did not attempt to stem terrorism at its roots. This is important to note. This inaction is a direct consequence of the Council’s inability to define the term “terrorism.” Identifying the economic, religious, or political motives of a would-be terrorist is impossible without first identifying what constitutes a terrorist. As Edward Luck reminds, “one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter.”[26]

Institutionalizing Counterterrorism

The following section identifies the various resolutions and committees that emerged following September 11. It examines how each contributes to the UN’s approach to counterterrorism, and where areas for future improvement may lie.

Resolutions

The Security Council passed Resolution 1368 on 12 September 2001. It was an immediate response to the terrorist attacks and recognized the United States’ right to self-defense in accordance with the UN Charter. During the session in which Resolution 1368 was passed, member states made powerful statements of solidarity. Many remarks reflected a shared realization: “the whole world and not just one country, had been plunged into an unprecedented time of peril, fear and uncertainty.”[27] Importantly, Resolution 1368 was the first time the Council formally acknowledged a member state’s right to self-defense as a legitimate response to nonstate violence.[28] It would not be the last. One year later, Russia cited the resolution when contemplating an invasion into Georgia to combat Chechnyan rebels.[29] The resolution invoked the UN Charter, providing member states a firm basis on which to ground their responses to terrorist attacks.[30] In this way, Resolution 1368 signaled the dawn of global counterterrorism.

Resolution 1373 followed shortly thereafter. This resolution was more expansive in scope and more severe in its approach. Unlike any resolution before it that “called on states” to adopt provisions, Resolution 1373 “decid[ed] that states” would adopt them. These provisions were not insignificant. They included three main types of action. First, governments were told to suppress terrorist financing, freeze the assets of known terrorists, and prevent nationals from channeling funds to terrorist organizations. Second, the resolution called on states to pass national legislation prohibiting the protection or allowance of terrorist organizations to operate within their territory, prosecute known terrorists, support counterterrorism efforts of other states, and strengthen border controls to prevent the movement of terrorists. Finally, the resolution encouraged states to share information and use early-warning systems to prevent another terrorist attack, and to adopt all relevant international conventions.[31]

Some states feared the Council had overstepped its bounds by requiring all member states to pass contentious legislation at the national level. The issue of what constituted a “terrorist” still loomed large. Most states agreed that terrorist activities and support of terrorist activities should be outlawed. Specifically, however, there was no consensus of what that meant in real terms.[32] Additionally, smaller and less developed states struggled to meet the requirements. As Chantal de Jonge Oudraat notes, “many states lacked the legislative and administrative capacity to implement the resolution.”[33] These requirements were expensive, required technical know-how, and depended on international cooperation and standardization. This was not always readily available. For example, de Jonge Oudraat observes many states misunderstood what the resolution meant when it said “stop financing terrorist.” Historically, states have used anti-money laundering policies to divert cash flows. However, modern day terrorism taps cash streams that come from legitimate sources. They do not necessarily operate in the shadow economy. Therefore, legislation passed within states was less effective than they believed.[34]

Resolution 1540 completed the UN’s evolution on counterterrorism. Inspiration for the resolution came from an increasing fear among Security Council members that terrorists would acquire weapons of mass destruction and carry out a massive attack. Concerns about nuclear, biological, and chemical proliferation spurred the Council to action in April 2004. Though the resolution’s language was deliberated more than 1373’s, the Council once again declared that states would adopt key elements. Resolution 1540 required states to take three general actions. First, governments were prohibited from supporting terrorist organizations in their attempts to acquire, manufacture, transport, or transfers WMDs. Second, they were again told to pass national legislation supportive of this prohibition. Third, states had to proactively prevent the proliferation of WMDs by securing borders, shipments, and nuclear sites. The same challenges that plagued implementation of Resolution 1373 struck Resolution 1540. The requirements were expansive, expensive, and technical. Many states struggled to meet these requirements, and few called on the UN for additional support – likely out of hesitation to involve a newly recharged multilateral in nation security affairs.

Committees

The Security Council anticipated the challenges of implementing resolutions 1373 and 1540. In the resolutions, therefore, it outlined the creation of dedicated committees to support states in their efforts. Decisions for this derived from a previous committee – also dedicated to counterterrorism. In 1999, the Security Council created the 1267 Committee, responsible for overseeing the sanctions regime imposed against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The 1267 Committee is arguably “the most hands-on element of the Council’s work on terrorism.”[35] The Committee is charged with monitoring and updating the Consolidated List with any new or re-emerging affiliates of al-Qaeda. This is no small task. Political scientist David Cortright explains, “The designation list of the al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee was the most extensive Security Council list, with nearly 500 individuals and entities designated as of 2006.”[36] The Committee must monitor all of the financial dealings of these suspected supporters. As previously mentioned, many revenue streams come from legitimate financial institutions that may not be willing or legally allowed to share proprietary information. The Committee’s responsibility extends far beyond the traditional state-monitoring approach used during the preceding decades.

The Security Council mirrored the 1267 Committee when it created the Counter Terrorism Committee under Resolution 1373. The Counter Terrorism Committee is designed to help member states implement the requirements of Resolution 1373, and is comprised of all fifteen Security Council members. It also benchmarks states’ progress on fulfilling the resolution by requiring report-outs. As of 2005, all states had submitted their initial reports and 169 states had submitted secondary reports. In total, over 622 reports have been filed, detailing states’ efforts to strengthen domestic legislation and institutions, as well as increase international cooperation.[37]

The Committee also works closely with other regional and international organizations. These collaborations help with burden-sharing. More importantly, they facilitate information-sharing that breeds more effective counterterrorism measures. These two responsibilities – monitoring and collaborating – capture the essence of the Committee. It was designed as a “hub and spoke” meant for coordinating efforts rather than inventing new policies.[38] Due to the inordinate administrative tasks that accompany this role, the Council approved the creation of a Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate, housed in the Secretariat with an executive director appointed by the Secretary-General. A similar approach was taken with the 1540 Committee. The 1540 Committee collects and evaluates reports submitted by member states on their progress towards implementing Resolution 1540. It has been an effective addition to the Security Council’s counterterrorism toolbox. Within its first year, 129 reports had been submitted to the Committee. Today, 164 initial reports have been made, along with follow-up reports from 110 countries.[39]

These three resolutions and committees serve as the cornerstones of the UN’s modern approach to counterterrorism. They were forged in an era of new fears about increased capabilities. While the first, they are certainly not the only bodies within the UN system focused on combatting terrorism. Fourteen entities within the New York Headquarters alone – spanning the Security Council, General Assembly, Secretary-General, and Economic and Social Council – oversee aspects of counterterrorism.[40] It is a herculean task that requires evaluation, adaptation, and flexibility.

The UN’s approach to counterterrorism evolved quickly following September 11. Many of the reforms were constructive. They marked important developments in the institution’s ability to respond to potential terrorist attacks. However, the reforms have focused on hard-security themes like self-defense, sanctions, and arms control. Ironically, the Security Council has failed to incorporate the type of work it does best: humanitarian aid and development. As mentioned earlier, none of the counterterrorism resolutions passed by the Security Council addressed the root causes of terrorism – including lack of education, poverty, cultural norms, and lack of democracy.[41] The UN should work to fully integrate these issues into its counterterrorism work. It is a natural fit. It would play to the UN’s core strengths as an institution and serve as a proactive, long-term approach to stemming violence. It is also a less politicized approach that avoids having to define who is considered a “terrorist.”

As the nature, capabilities, and reach of terrorist organizations has evolved over the last two decades, so too has the UN’s approach to counter them. Moments of crisis have yielded effective reforms. However, the Security Council should not wait for another world event to evaluate its approach to counterterrorism. It has useful tools that can be sharpened and complemented, and an organization ready in waiting to lend its support.

Works Cited

[1] Boulden, Jane, “The Security Council and Terror,” The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945, Oxford, 2010, p. 609.

[2] SC Res. 57 (1948)

[3] Karns, Margaret, and Mingst, Karen, “The United Nations and Conflict Management,” Leashing the Dogs of War, United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009, p. 513.

[4] Gray, Christine, “Charter Limitations on the Use of Force,” The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945, Oxford, 2010, p.95.

[5] United Nations, High Level Panel Report on Terrorism, accessed 30 April 2014, web.

[6] Boulden, Jane, and Weiss, Thomas, “Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11,” Indiana University Press, 2004, p. 221.

[7] Boulden, Jane, and Weiss, Thomas, “Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11,” Indiana University Press, 2004, p. 221.

[8] Boulden, Jane, and Weiss, Thomas, “Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11,” Indiana University Press, 2004, p. 223.

[9] Luck, Edward, “Tackling Terrorism,” The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, International Peace Academy, 2004, p. 95.

[10] Mani, Rama, “The Root Causes of Terrorism and Conflict Prevention,” Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11,” Indiana Press, 2004, p. 223.

[11] Karns, Margaret, and Mingst, Karen, “The United Nations and Conflict Management,” Leashing the Dogs of War, United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009, p. 513.

[12] Laub, Zachary, and Masters, Jonathan, “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)” Council on Foreign Relations, 8 January 2014, web.

[13] Luck, Edward, “Tackling Terrorism,” The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, International Peace Academy, 2004, p. 87.

[14] Boulden, Jane, “The Council and Terrorism,” The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945, Oxford, 2010, p. 611.

[15] Boulden, Jane, “The Council and Terrorism,” The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945, Oxford, 2010, p. 611.

[16] Weiss, Thomas, Forsythe, David, Coate, Roger, and Pease, Kelly-Kate, “The United Nations and Changing World Politics,” Westview Press, 2014, p. 131.

[17] Luck, Edward, “Tackling Terrorism,” The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, International Peace Academy, 2004, p. 95.

[18] SC Res. 1269 (1999)

[19] Boulden, Jane, “The Council and Terrorism,” The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945, Oxford, 2010, p. 611.

[20] Luck, Edward, “Tackling Terrorism,” The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, International Peace Academy, 2004, p. 85.

[21] Boulden, Jane, “The Council and Terrorism,” The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945, Oxford, 2010, p. 610.

[22] de Jonge Oudratt, Chantal, “The Role of the Security Council,” Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11, Indiana University Press, 2004, p. 151.

[23] de Jonge Oudratt, Chantal, “The Role of the Security Council,” Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11, Indiana University Press, 2004, p. 151.

[24] Cronin, Audrey Kurth, “Rethinking Sovereignty: American Strategy in the Age of Terrorism,” Survival 44, No. 2, p. 123.

[25] Mani, Rama, “The Root Causes of Terrorism and Conflict Prevention,” Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11,” Indiana Press, 2004, p. 224.

[26] Luck, Edward, “Tackling Terrorism,” The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, International Peace Academy, 2004, p. 85.

[27] United Nations Press Release, “Security Council Condemns, ‘In Strongest Terms’,Terrorist Attacks on United States,” SC/7143, 12 September 2001.

[28] Weiss, Thomas, Forsythe, David, Coate, Roger, and Pease, Kelly-Kate, “The United Nations and Changing World Politics,” Westview Press, 2014, p. 131.

[30] Boulden, Jane, and Weiss, Thomas, “Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11,” Indiana University Press, 2004, p. 163.

[31] Boulden, Jane, “The Council and Terrorism,” The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945, Oxford, 2010, p. 612.

[32] de Jonge Oudratt, Chantal, “The Role of the Security Council,” Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11, Indiana University Press, 2004, p. 163.

[33] de Jonge Oudratt, Chantal, “The Role of the Security Council,” Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11, Indiana University Press, 2004, p. 162.

[34] de Jonge Oudratt, Chantal, “The Role of the Security Council,” Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11, Indiana University Press, 2004, p. 162.

[35] Boulden, Jane, “The Security Council and Terror,” The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945, Oxford, 2010, p. 615.

[36] Cortright, David, and Loze, George, “Reforming Sanctions,” The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, International Peace Academy, 2004, p. 167.

[37] Boulden, Jane, “The Council and Terrorism,” The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945, Oxford, 2010, p. 615.

[38] Boulden, Jane, “The Council and Terrorism,” The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945, Oxford, 2010, p. 616.

[39] 1540 Committee, “UNSC Resolution 1540,” United Nations, 2 May 2014, web.

[40] Tardy, Thierry, “The Inherent Difficulties of Interinstitutional Cooperation in Fighting Terrorism,” Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11, Indiana University Press, 2004, p. 123.

[41] de Jonge Oudratt, Chantal, “The Role of the Security Council,” Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11, Indiana University Press, 2004, p. 166.