Michael Lenihan

TALKING TO THE ENEMY

Modern-day warfare against non-state actors is unconventional by nature. Negotiating peace with them does not have to be. As with any instance where belligerents are fighting, the objective of conflict resolution is to stop violence through dialogue. This can only be done if vested parties are given the opportunity to voice their perspectives. As argued below, engaging non-state actors offers a number of benefits that makes the likelihood of a durable peace much more obtainable. Indeed, there are serious risks associated with engagement. However, none is so severe as to negate the benefits it affords. The role of mediator comes with Herculean tasks, made none the easier by discounting groups that can potentially carry significant populist authority. In most negotiations – but especially these – engaging with the non-state actors can be one of the most adroit strategies a mediator can make.

The first benefit of engaging armed non-state actors in peace agreements is that the political process is promoted while the effectiveness of violence is demoted. When armed groups are brought into the fold, a new channel of recourse is presented that did not exist prior: open dialogue. The value of this opportunity cannot be underestimated. Prior to the creation of formal and regulated negotiations, armed groups (oftentimes described as terrorist groups) have few other choices for expressing their dissatisfaction with the political realities on the ground. Out of necessity, violent opposition emerges as the approach of last resort. Noting the strategic use of violence’s historic trend among groups, terrorism expert Martha Crenshaw explains,

“In nineteenth-century Russia, the failure of nonviolent movements contributed to the rise of terrorism. In Ireland, terrorism followed the failure of Parnell’s constitutionalism. In the Palestinian-Israeli struggle, terrorism followed the failure of Arab efforts at conventional warfare against Israel. In general, the ‘nonstate’ or ‘substate’ users of terrorism…are constrained in their options by the lack of active mass support and by the superior power arrayed against them [by the state].”[1]

Terrorism, Crenshaw argues, is a strategic tactic used by groups to achieve political goals. This reading of terrorism enables further discussion about how radical groups might be engaged in the peace process. (Counterarguments to Crenshaw’s theory positing that terrorists have an innate predisposition to violence and use terrorism as an outlet are fatalistic and neuter discussions about how radicals can be brought into a rational peacemaking process.)

Promoting the political process carries two advantages. First, it strengthens liberal, international norms like the rule of law. Whereas terrorism relies on violence to convey its political message, negotiations use discourse. Over time, this builds on the framework offered by the international community that positions rule of law and democratic governance as cornerstones of successful states. For transitioning democracies emerging out of conflict, these norms are invaluable. Constructive discourse legitimates the state and projects a positive image of democratic values.

More concretely, the political process reduces the chances of violence and illicit activities from carrying over from wartime into peacetime. During protracted periods of conflict, wartime economies emerge. The trade or sale of weapons, humans, and drugs is an increasingly common occurrence. Witness the circulation of light arms among powerful warlords in Congo, the cigarette smuggling networks established in the Balkans during the 1990s, or ISIL’s abduction of women and girls for forced prostitution. These lucrative shadow economies fund armed groups’ activities. They risk being driven underground in peacetime if their controllers are not given an opportunity to find alternate (and legitimate) sources of power. A 2009 report from the UN Secretary-General highlights this point, stating, “The profits earned by black marketeers, drug lords, smugglers, traffickers, and government or guerrilla commanders cannot be underestimated…Where income from the export of narcotics or valuable commodities cannot be stopped, peace is less likely.”[2] Thus, state actors have an incentive to engage non-state actors in peace negotiations. If an agreement is reached, the state stands to increase its revenue, reduce the influence of organized crime, and create a safer, less violent state for its citizens.

The second benefit of adopting a policy of engagement towards armed non-state actors is that is keeps all options open for the government. States that vow never to negotiate with non-state or terrorist organizations usually wind up reneging on that pledge. Describing the Spanish government’s repeated attempts to quell Basque separatists, Teresa Whitfield notes the predictable pattern of capitulation: “Every aspiring prime minister since Spain’s transition had vowed never to negotiate with ETA, yet every elected prime minister had ended up trying to do so.”[3] Such an about-face in official state policy risks disappointing hardliners within the government’s own constituency, and emboldening non-state actors by suggesting they have won legitimacy through extreme violent means. A more scientific analysis of the “no negotiations” philosophy comes from international relations professor Camille Pecastaing, who suggests,

“Such measures are not just deterrents; they are denials. They intend to seal terrorists off at all possible levels: not just from the use of force but also from the right to make legitimate demands. In the long run, this intransigence not only limits the government’s options but has the potential of radicalizing terrorists.”[4]

States can avoid these embarrassing and sometimes compromising contradictions with a policy of active engagement. This instead allows states to articulate comprehensive arguments and expectations about the goals of the negotiation, control the media narrative, and work openly with non-state actors that wield considerable influence in parts of a country or region.

The third benefit of introducing non-state actors into the peace process is the opportunity to discern best practices in the evolving field of conflict resolution. Since the end of the Cold War, the nature of conflict has changed. Mediators no longer operate in a bipolar world where proxy conflicts are moderated by the great superpowers. Instead, conflicts have become more common, localized and, on average, more deadly.[5] The nature of them has also evolved. Whereas Cold War-era conflicts revolved around geopolitical motives, today’s conflicts are more sophisticated. South Sudanese politician Francis Deng points to one issue – national identity – that plagued Sudan during its half-century-long conflict. He writes,

“What distinguishes the Sudanese situation from the general challenge of governance implied by normal politics is that the crisis of national identity separates the people of the South from the government. In political terms, they are not ‘its people;’ they do not see the government as theirs; they see the government as unresponsive to their needs; the task of the insurgents as they see it is to restructure the country’s identity and its leadership…”[6]

The seemingly intractableness of the issues fueling these intrastate conflicts – like national identity – means mediators will need more exposure and familiarity with non-state actors. Only by understanding what motives drive their resistance will mediators be able to address root causes and help stem conflict. “Will not negotiate” philosophies prevent practitioners from identifying best practices that can solve other or future conflicts.

While engaging armed non-state actors carries significant advantages, it also poses some serious risks. Of great concern is the power of non-state actors to derail negotiations because they have “nothing to lose.” In these scenarios, the non-state actor holds out until more and more concessions are made, slowing down the process or else paralyzing it altogether. In other instances, the armed group can act as a “spoiler” – actively sabotaging negotiations in an attempt to preserve their source of revenue and power. Such was the case with RENAMO in Mozambique, the Hutus in Rwanda, or UNITA in Angola.[7] Instances where spoilers threaten a peace process delegitimize the effort. Worse, they can prolong violence on the ground until they are in a better position to negotiate on their own terms.

A second risk associated with engaging armed non-state actors comes as a by-product of deciding which groups are afforded a seat at the table. In conflicts where there are more than one non-state actor (such as Syria’s revolution, Afghanistan’s war against the Soviet Union, or Somalia’s civil war) the mediator is tasked with identifying which “official unofficials” will be represented in discussions. Since decisions are oftentimes based on which groups are the key actors, smaller factions may respond in turn by increasing their violent behavior in an attempt to gain a voice in the process. International relations professor I. William Zartman explains the paradoxical effect negotiations have on violent resistance:

“Negotiation actually encourages terrorism…Let[ting] terrorists shoot their way through civilian casualties into policy decisions reward[s] their blackmail and only encourages others to do the same…Thus engaging terrorists to bring terrorism to an end carries the moral hazard of doing the reverse.”[8]

Similarly, negotiations also pose another risk: the increase in violence due to splintering within “official unofficials.” In this situation, it is the exact groups selected to negotiate – and not their “lesser” peer groups – that are the sources of increased violence. During negotiations, hardline stances are brought to the surface, both from within the state and from the non-state actors. As moderates continue with the dialogue, hardliners peel off and revert back to violence in an attempt to sour inter-party relations. For examples, the Irish Republican Army, the armed branch of the political organization Sinn Fein, continued terrorist activities even as more moderates within Sinn Fein attempted negotiations. Without leverage over the hardliners, Sinn Fein appealed to US Senator George Mitchell to remain a party to the talks, while attempting to temper down belligerent leaders within the IRA.[9] Zartman articulates well how internal politics can complicate negotiations, or increase illicit or violent behavior:

“‘Organization’ is usually a misnomer. Usually there are many organizations, of unclear structure, competing with one another, riddled with factions, torn over the tactical question of whether to talk or fight. And beneath the ‘organization’ often lie substrata of tribal, ethnic, and traditional groups and allegiances, increasingly mingled with, or replaced by, criminal elements as time goes on.”[10]

Therefore, the task of selecting which groups become official representatives in peace negotiations is a task fraught with political landmines. Groups excluded from talks may increase rates of violence, as might hardliner groups included! For a mediator charged with ending conflict, these unintended consequences pose legitimate challenges.

The third risk posed by engaging with armed non-state actors is fallout from state actors who object to any official recognition of the non-state actor. Putting non-state actors at the same table as government representatives at once elevates non-state actors’ status while diminishing the government’s authority in the eyes of the public. Authors Isak Svensson and Peter Wallensteen note the detrimental effects this perceived slight can have on a peace process. Citing the UN’s failed efforts in Darfur, they note, “Key actors could not accept having their representatives sit side-by-side with what they saw as splinter groups. Thus, they preferred not to attend the negotiations. This in turn reduced the legitimacy of the talks because they were not fully representative.”[11] In many instances, state actors would rather forgo peace negotiations than risk jeopardizing their status of the sole legitimate power. After all, “opening negotiations is the recognition de jure of a political reality established de facto by the opposition’s ability to sustain a political challenge over time, through terrorism or other means.”[12] As is discussed later, the emergence of Track II diplomatic organizations greatly reduces this risk by affording backchannel opportunities for state and non-state actors to engage.

While the risks mentioned above certainly pose challenges to negotiations, they by no means amount to an insurmountable feat. Mediators can overcome these challenges using creative approaches and best practices. Regarding non-state actors’ mentality of “nothing to lose,” mediators can manufacture incentives that would give groups “skin in the game.” This might be some sort of power-sharing agreement post-conflict if groups are cooperative. On the fear that choosing “official unofficials” may inspire more violence between factions, mediators have been able to successfully use the notion of the “peace train leaving the station” to draw groups back to the table. Similarly, in instances when the mediator questions his choice of an inclusive approach, it may be of some solace to know that many times, exclusive approaches are no more successful. Seasoned UN mediator Jan Eliasson remarked on his experience negotiating with myriad factions in Sudan, shrugging, “I ask myself whether I was right to use the inclusive approach. It was a tough call. Our successor tried a different approach, only inviting the main movements. That did not work either: some of the splinter movements were strong enough to prevent any progress.”[13] Finally, regarding the risk of upsetting state actors, as mentioned previously, Track II organizations can prove invaluable. These informal negotiations offer a workaround that keeps negotiations away from public scrutiny while offering all parties an outlet for discussing their positions.

In conclusion, negotiations will always be a politically fraught experience, regardless of who is sitting at the table; the inclusion of armed non-state actors does not automatically create an insurmountable set of challenges. Engaging non-state actors helps build a nascent democracy’s rule of law, upholds international norms, maintains a consistent image of the state actor, and helps the mediation field prepare for the evolving nature of conflict in the decades ahead. If handled skillfully, armed non-state actors can play a helpful role in creating peace.

Works Cited

[1] Crenshaw, Martha. 1998. The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice. In Walter Reich (Ed.), Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (7-24). Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

[2] United Nations. (2009). Report of the Secretary-General on enhancing mediation and its support activities (S/2009/189). New York, NY.

[3] Whitfield, Teresa. (2014). Endgame for ETA: Elusive peace in the Basque Country. London: C. Hurst and Co.

[4] Pecastaing, Camille. (2007). Facing Terrorism: Engagement and De-escalation. In I. William Zartman and Guy Olivier Faure (Eds.), Engaging Extremists: Trade-offs, timing, and diplomacy (169-202). Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace.

[5] Harbom, Lotta, Stina Hogbladh, and Peter Wallensteen, (2014). Armed Conflicts and Peace Agreements. Journal of Peace Research, 43, 617-631.

[6] Deng, Francis Mading. (1995). Negotiating a Hidden Agenda: Sudan’s Conflict of Identities. In I. William Zartman (Ed.), Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars (77-102). Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute.

[7] Stedman, Stephen John, (1997). Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes. International Security, 22. 5-53.

[8] Zartman, I. William. (1995). Dynamic Constraints in Negotiations in Internal Conflicts. In I. William Zartman (Ed.), Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars (3-29). Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute.

[9] Mitchell, George J. (1999). Making Peace. London: University of California Press

[10] Zartman, I. William. (1995). Dynamic Constraints in Negotiations in Internal Conflicts. In I. William Zartman (Ed.), Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars (3-29). Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute.

[11] Svensson, Isak and Peter Wallensteen. (2010). The Go-Between Jan Eliasson and the Styles of Mediation. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace.

[12] Pecastaing, Camille. (2007). Facing Terrorism: Engagement and De-escalation. In I. William Zartman and Guy Olivier Faure (Eds.), Engaging Extremists: Trade-offs, timing, and diplomacy (169-202). Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace.

[13] Svensson, Isak and Peter Wallensteen. (2010). The Go-Between Jan Eliasson and the Styles of Mediation. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace.