UNDERSTANDING ASSAD'S POWER
The Assad family (1994). Hafez al-Assad and wife Anisa Makhlouf. Back row, from left to right: Maher, Bashar, Basil, Majid, and Bushra al-Assad
President Bashar al-Assad’s regime has survived over five years of civil war. Its hold on power seemed most tenuous at the revolt’s immediate outset. Rebel forces made significant territorial gains, and the regime lacked a coordinated response. However, the regime withstood the onslaught. It is arguably now stronger than ever. Six factors contribute to its success. Internal factors include Assad’s insular political power structure, mobilization of religious and ethnic minorities, and a disjointed opposition. External factors include critical support from friendly neighbors, the distracting emergence of ISIS, and domestic political challenges within the US. Combined, these factors have enabled the Assad regime’s survival.
Consider the first internal factor – Bashar’s political power structure. Three pillars support his regime: his political advisors, the military, and a network of business elites. Bashar al-Assad inherited the National Progressive Front from his father, Hafez al-Assad. The NPF was a carefully-crafted political machine that balanced religious and ethnic communities and controlled security apparatuses through familial and tribal connections. When Hafez died in 2000, Bashar became the beneficiary of this machine. He was “elected” into power with 97 percent of the vote, and was immediately embraced by his father’s ardent political supporters. However, Bashar saw flaws in this system. He sought to slowly liberalize the Syrian economy and enable some political discourse within civil society. His efforts of “authoritarian upgrading” during the Damascus Spring did not bode well among the old guard, however. Fearful of losing their powerful and lucrative positions within the military-mercantile complex, senior advisors pushed back on Bashar’s reforms.
Instead of acquiescing to his father’s cronies, Bashar recalculated. In two phases, he swept out the old guard that opposed his reforms. The first came in 2005 when Bashar engineered the 10th Syrian Party Congress to exclude senior-level advisors whom had been loyal to his father. The second wave was in 2010, when Bashar removed lower-level advisors who opposed policies that jeopardized their clout. Ironically, these two sweeps – meant to help Bashar more easily address public concerns – only further isolated the regime from the Syrian people. In effect, Bashar cleared a path for his policies, but disrupted the fragile relationships that connected his regime to Syrian society. Bashar’s efforts to surround himself with loyal technocrats strengthened the regime’s cohesion while weakening its perception among the public. The lines were thus drawn for the political showdown: the Assad regime versus the Syrian people.
Bashar al-Assad’s political clout is buttressed by his command over Syria’s security forces. Unlike other Arab Spring countries, the Syrian military and mukhabarat are fiercely loyal to Bashar. These forces are led by Alawis who are driven by existential fears to maintain stability. Ten months into the conflict, rebel forces were badly beating the Syrian Army. Despite this, there was not one major defection. Instead, the military remained “largely cohesive.”
The final pillar of Bashar’s regime is his intimate network of business elites. In 2005, Syria joined the Greater Arab Free Trade Area. This opened the country to previously closed channels of foreign investments from countries like Turkey and Iran. FDI increased from $111 million in 2001 to $1.6 billion in 2006, with most of the money going to housing, banking, and tourism. By the time the insurrection began, nearly $20 billion in Gulf capital had been invested in luxury hotels. These projects largely benefited business elites in Damascus, which not coincidentally remains Bashar’s stronghold.
The second internal factor contributing to Bashar’s survival is the implicit support of religious minorities. Syria is a Sunni-majority country, but there are also Alawis (12%), Greek Orthodox (9%), Kurdish (9%), Armenian Christians (4%) and Druze (3%). The threat of Salafi jihadism has sparked panic among these groups. As a result, these communities support the Assad regime, rather than face persecution under a potentially vindictive Sunni government. Assad has capitalized on an “us versus them” mentality, creating a buffer around his regime.
The last internal factor supporting Bashar’s regime is the division between Syria’s opposition forces. The Syrian National Coalition represents at least 30 different factions. Journalists on the ground have documented hundreds more factions, not including radical groups like Jabhat al-Nusra or ISIS. These groups seek varying territorial and political objectives and conduct violent raids against each other while battling the Assad regime. Such a loosely organized opposition cannot overcome Syria’s military, especially without external intervention.
Three external factors also contribute to Bashar’s lasting hold on power. First, note the critical support the regime has gotten from its friendly neighbors – specifically Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia. Iran has funneled money, cheap arms, and electronic warfare weapons to the Syrian military. Hezbollah has sent scores of fighters across the border to tip the scales in favor of the Assad regime. Russia – driven by geostrategic, ideological, and economic motives – has provided “diplomatic protection” to guard the regime against international intervention.
The last two factors contributing to Assad’s survival are closely linked: the emergence of ISIS and confusion among US policymakers on an effective intervention strategy. When Bashar abandoned Baathist principles early on in his presidency, he created an ideological void. Over time, the space was filled in part by Islamic fundamentalists. These groups, empowered by heavy influence from al-Qaeda in Iraq, were the genesis of ISIS. Now a major security threat, ISIS has detracted international focus away from the Assad regime. The group’s surprising surge in 2014 can partly be attributed to indecision by US policymakers on an effective early intervention strategy in Syria. Lack of US leadership created an environment where ISIS could flourish. Now, a coalition of sixty countries is concerned with the ISIS threat, leaving Assad to his own devices.
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